Many of those lenders were subsequently forced to take huge charges in 1997 and 1998 to undo the gains they had previously booked from securitizations. Some suffered larger credit losses, but most had severely underestimated the prepayment speeds of their borrowers when interest rates dropped. When borrowers refinance, the future interest payments that the companies have already recognized as income disappear. Never mind that auto loans have a much lower rate of refinancing than mortgages; anything subprime and anything to do with gain-on-sale accounting couldn't be trusted.

The solution was to give the market what it wants. Along with the GAAP financials, Berce began disclosing earnings on a "portfolio" basis, as if the firm had not sold its loans. It recognized income as received and costs as incurred, just like a traditional lender. The practice reassured the market that the firm's earnings growth was no accounting mirage. "AmeriCredit managed to differentiate itself from the rest of the industry," says Goldman Sachs analyst Robert Hottensen.

In April 1999, the increased transparency paid off when AmeriCredit became the first subprime lender since the meltdown to tap the high-yield market, raising $200 million. The rating agencies affirmed AmeriCredit's BB- rating, but threatened a downgrade if equity wasn't raised soon. The opportunity came four months later, when AmeriCredit also became the first subprime finance company to raise equity since before the previous fall. It took more than 80 presentations and a two-week road show, but Berce managed to raise $112 million. "The high-yield deal broke the logjam," he says. "It took care of the short-term liquidity concern for all our constituents."

With the liquidity issue resolved, Berce turned his attention to the reinsurers. Again he was forced to explain why his company was any less of a risk than other specialty lenders. "I made a lot of trips to New York to convince the reinsurers to step into the void," says Berce. Again, it paid off. In October 1999, the company signed a unique $225 million revolving facility with a group of four reinsurers to fund the company's cash-reserve requirements. Shortly thereafter, the banks came around. During the rest of 1999 and into 2000, Berce signed up 10 new banking partners for credit facilities that increased the company's capacity from $500 million to $2 billion.

With far fewer competitors on the landscape, the company is growing at a 40 percent to 50 percent annual rate. The slowing economy will almost certainly test the credit quality of the company's loan portfolio. But with Daniel Berce running the finances, AmeriCredit likely won't lack for capital.

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